




China, Africa and the WHO : a challenge 
for post covid19 multilateralism
Valérie Niquet1
China plays a significant role in Africa, particularly in Ethiopia, 
where the current Director-General of the WHO was Minister of 
Health and then Minister of Foreign Affairs. This opaque influence 
and the support given by Beijing to Dr. Tedros seems to have 
weighed on the positions taken by the WHO in the face of the Covid 
19 crisis. The consequences of these decisions are now being felt 
worldwide and contribute to undermining the credibility of a fragile 
multilateral system. 
China and Africa: Historically Strong Ties
China rediscovered Africa in 1996. In May of that year, President 
Jiang Zemin visited six African countries: Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Mali, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. In doing so, China, which since 1979 
had been focused on its development following the implementation of 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform policy, was returning to a tradition 
that allows it – until today – to capitalize on its status of “developing” 
countr y sharing the same experience. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
Beijing supported liberation movements in in its favor, against Soviet 
“revisionism”. It was also the period of the “barefoot doctors” sent to 
several African countries to set up primary health care based on the 
Chinese model. It was also the time of the Tanzam Railway (Tanzania-
Zambia) the first “model” infrastructure construction project, built 
between 1968 and 1973
From the 1980s onwards, the end of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the 
collapse of the USSR, and the reduction of ideological tensions with 
the West, as Beijing launched economic reform, The importance of 
Africa in China’s strategic thinking has been for a time reduced. 
1　 Valérie Niquet, senior visiting fellow, JIIA, head of Asia Department, FRS is the 
author of La puissance chinoise en 100 questions, Tallandier, Paris, 2017. A 
version of this paper has been published in French on https://www.frstrategie.
org/publications/notes/un-defi-pour-multilateralisme-instrumentalisation-
afrique-chine-ses-consequences-sur-decisions-oms-2020
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The mid-1990s marked a turning point. 
Several motivations drove the renewed interest 
in Africa: new needs for natural resources 
and energy, African Union support at the UN 
on issues of direct interest to the PRC, and a 
strategy focused on Taiwan aiming to reduce 
the island’s diplomatic influence after the first 
election of a Taiwanese president by universal 
suffrage.2
In this context, President Jiang Zemin’s visit 
laid the foundations for China’s Africa policy 
“for a new era.”3 These principles, which are still 
valid today, are, in theory, “non-interference,” 
“win-win” economic cooperation and equality.4 
From 2003 to 2013, Jiang Zemin’s successor, 
Hu Jintao, did consolidate these developments 
by visiting 18 African countries in ten years. Xi 
Jinping has also symbolically dedicated his first 
trip abroad as President, to Africa in 2013 and 
did return in 2018. In nearly 25 years, Africa has 
thus become a major playing field for China’s 
foreign strategy, well beyond the economy. 
An essential role at the United Nations
From the outset, the weight of African union 
states at the UN has been an important factor 
for Beijing.5 In 1996, General Xiong Guangkai 
wrote that “African states account for a third of 
the UN’s membership.”6 Increased from 52 to 
54, this weight has only increased and is still a 
major factor for the PRC on the international 
scene. After T iananmen in 1989, and the 
sanctions that for a time hit China, the weight 
of African countries vote in commissions such 
2　 In 1995-96, China attempted a campaign of military intimidation lasting several months with missile test launches 
off the island, interrupted by the dispatch of a US aircraft carrier in the Taiwan strait. This campaign contributed to 
the election of President Lee Teng-hui.
3　 “This theme of the  “new era” is a constant in Chinese ideological discourse.
4　 Valerie Niquet, “Profit and Prejudice, China in Africa,” China News Analysis, n°1574, 15-12-1996.
5　 Valerie Niquet, “La stratégie africaine de la Chine”, Politique étrangère, 2006/2.
6　 Xiong Guangkai, “China Defense Policy and Sino-African Relations,” International Strategic Studies, No. 31997 in 
Valerie Niquet, “Profit and Prejudice, China in Africa,” op.cit.
as the Human Rights commission played a 
significant role. In exchange for some African 
Union countries’ support, China, a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council, has 
regularly been able to veto sanctions against 
the most repressive African regimes such as 
Zimbabwe or Sudan. 
The support of African countries also played 
a role in China’s offensive against the G4 (Japan, 
Germany, India, Brazil) initiative launched in 
2005, on the 60th anniversary of its creation, to 
reform the UN Security Council. For Beijing, 
this reform, initiated by Japan, was a direct 
threat to its capacity to influence and its very 
privileged status as the sole representative of 
Asian countries – and countries of the South – 
with a veto right at the UN. 
At another level, China’s strategies of 
influence in Africa from the mid-1990s onwards, 
supported by its rapid economic development, 
made it possible to reduce Taiwan’s diplomatic 
weight considerably. While about twenty African 
countries recognized Taiwan in the early 
1990s, only Swaziland is still present, since the 
defection of Burkina Faso in 2020.
China’s  inf luence in  international 
organizations and the role of the African 
Union vote
The suppor t of the African Union at the 
UN, and more generally of countries of the 
South that share the same “values,” has also 







international organizations.7 This development 
corresponds to the concept of “central stage”( 舞
台 中 心 ) used by Xi Jinping since he came to 
power. At the 19th Communist Party Congress 
in 2017, the Chinese president declared: “China 
has now become a great power in the world. It is 
time for us to take a central place ( 走上世界舞台
中心 ) on the world stage. ”
As a result, taking advantage, particularly 
in Africa, of its economic and diplomatic 
weight, China now heads four of the fifteen 
commissions under the UN, the only member 
of the Security Council to hold more than one. 
China now leads the international civil aviation 
organization, food and agriculture organization, 
the industrial development organization, and 
the international telecommunications union. 
All these organizations are directly related to 
China’s BRI connectivity projects, including the 
global development of 5G. 
C h i n a  h a s  a l s o  b e e n  a t  t h e  h e a d  o f 
WHO (World Health Organization), with 
Dr.Margaret Chan, from 2013 to 2016, and 
has actively suppor ted the candidacy of 
the organization’s current Director, Tedros 
Adhanom Ghebreyesus, elected in 2017. China’s 
support and choice of Dr. Tedros is another 
manifestation of the process of China’s direct or 
indirect takeover of international organizations. 
After the SARS crisis in 2003, the severity of 
the WHO denunciations worried the Chinese 
regime, which has since tried, to limit the scope 
of criticism by strengthening its capacity to 
influence.
This influence, in the case of the WHO, does 
not involve particularly large direct financial 
suppor t, contrar y to what has been said. 
7　 For instance, in November 2011, the Information Office of the State Council convened the second “South-South 
Human Right Forum” in Beijing. It planned to implement the “Beijing Declaration” which rejects the principle of 
universal values and defends the right to development as equivalent to Human Rights. 
8　https://www.who.int/about/finances-accountability/funding/AC_Status_Report_2019.pdf?ua=1
9　 Valerie Niquet, Alain Touati, La Chine en Afrique, intérêts et pratiques, essai d'analyse du mode de fonctionnement 
d'un système, Les études de l'IFRI, Paris, 2008.
Since 2014, in relation to its demographic and 
economic weight, China’s official contribution 
has increased. However, it was only USD 
18,948,900 in 2019, while that of the United 
States reached USD 58,991,024, and that of 
Japan USD 23,156,735. Voluntary contributions, 
which today constitute a majority share of 
WHO’s funding, were USD 86 million for China, 
while those of the United States reached USD 
893 million in 2019.8
Nevertheless, China has been able to build on 
the fallouts of its strategy of influence in Africa, 
which involves very substantial financing of 
prestigious projects linked to the governments 
in place, and investment programs vital for the 
development of infrastructures in the countries 
concerned. 
Strengthened economic dependency
China became interested in the African 
continent as a source of raw materials and 
energy, as it  became the world’s largest 
consumer of these commodities. Angola, for 
example, is one of China’s leading suppliers 
of oil. Gabon’s forests, poorly controlled, have 
been over-exploited by Chinese companies.9 
Africa is also an essential source of rare metals 
that are indispensable to China’s high tech 
industr y. Finally, if it does not compensate 
for the large European and North American 
markets, the African market, especially for 
lower quality products produced by Chinese 
SMEs or telecommunication companies, is also 
significant. 
The first Forum for China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC), based on the Japanese model of the 





Development (TICAD) conferences inaugurated 
in 1993, was held in Beijing in 2000, bringing 
together 52 African Heads of State. The forum is 
held alternately in China and Africa every three 
years and has grown in size since 2006. 
At another level, thanks to the considerable 
financial funds at its disposal, and a “flexibility” 
in decision-making that powers that respect 
more constraining norms of sustainable 
development, transparency and anti-corruption 
do not have, China became a major investors 
and lender in Africa. However, China is both a 
major lender in the framework of its BRI (Belt 
and Road Initiative) projects, while at the same 
time still a major borrower at the World Bank. 
At the G 20 meeting to suspend debt interests’ 
payments from countries hit by Covid19 that 
took place in April 2020, China agreed to sign 
with however a few caveats to exclude its BRI 
loans.10
Since 2010, China has also become Africa’s 
largest trading partner. Trade peaked at $170 
billion in 2017 and then slowed down as China’s 
economic growth slowed. Similarly, at its peak, 
according to of ficial statistics, cumulative 
Chinese investment in Africa reached $43 billion 
in 2017.11
The case of Ethiopia
Ethiopia, the country of origin of the current 
Director-General of WHO, occupies a special 
place in China’s Africa strategy. Although lacking 
in raw materials, China very quickly focused its 
interest on Ethiopia, with which it established 
diplomatic relations as early as 1970. Since the 
People’s Democratic Liberation Front came to 
10　 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2020-04-27/chinese-debt-could-cause-emerging-markets-
implode
11　 人民日报 , (People’s Daily), 30-08-2018.
12　 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, «China and Ethiopia, Authoritarian Affinities and Economic Cooperation,» China Perspectives, 
2012-4.
13　 “Ethiopia Eastern Industrial Zone,” China Daily, 13-02-2019.
14　 “Jean-Pierre Cabestan, op.cit.
power in 1991, ideological ties between Beijing 
and Addis Ababa have been strengthened, 
including party-to-party ties with the Chinese 
Communist Party. The regional headquarters of 
the Xinhua agency, one of the principal organs 
of the Communist Party’s external propaganda 
apparatus, is located in Addis Ababa, as is the 
headquarters of the Sino-African Development 
Fund.12 
China had also set up in 2017 an “Eastern 
Economic Zone,” specializing in the production 
and expor t of textile and leather products, 
agricultural products, metallurgy, building 
materials, The official presentation of this special 
economic zone insists on the fact that Ethiopia, 
due to its status as a developing country, enjoys 
privileged access to the North American and 
European markets, without quotas or customs 
duties, which explains the relocation movement 
of Chinese companies to this country.13
China is also the country’s largest source of 
foreign investment and Ethiopia’s largest trading 
partner. These investments, 147 more projects 
accepted in 2019, concern the infrastructure 
sector, including the construction of a high-
speed line to Djibouti, where China (APL) has a 
logistics base since 2018. China has also enabled 
Ethiopia to launch its first remote sensing 
satellite, ETRSS-1, in 2019. 
Ethiopia is also ver y dependent on the 
“status” that China confers on it. In 2003, the 
second FOCAC forum was held in Addis Ababa. 
China fully financed and built the headquarters 
of the African Union, which was inaugurated in 
December 2012, symbolically making Ethiopia 







Most significantly, the new African Center 
for Diseases Control, established in 2017, is 
headquar tered in Addis Ababa, and China 
has offered to build this headquarters for $80 
million.15 It is through this center, in Ethiopia, 
that products supplied by China for the fight 
against Covid19 in Africa must also transit 
before being redistributed.
The role of Mr. Tedros and the positioning 
of the WHO
It is in these many capacities that questions 
have been raised about the role of the new WHO 
Director-General elected in May 2017 with the 
support of. Today in charge of managing the 
coronavirus crisis, he is a former cadre of the 
Marxist-Leninist Liberation Front of Tigray, 
supported by China (and Albania) against the 
Addis Ababa authorities close to Moscow in the 
1970s and 1980s.16 He was successively Minister 
of Health from 2005 to 2012 and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs from 2013 to 2017. In both cases, 
his position implied close relations at the state, 
political and economic levels with China, which 
had become an unavoidable partner of Ethiopia. 
As soon as he was elected head of the WHO, 
Mr. Tedros supported the Chinese proposal to 
appoint former President Robert Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe as “Goodwill Ambassador for WHO,” 
before retracting in the face of strong opposition. 
L ikewise,  as  the of f ic ia l  Chinese press 
immediately reported, he assured Beijing, upon 
his election, that WHO would continue to adhere 
15　 https://www.ft.com/content/cef96328-475a-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441
16　 Tefera Negash Gebregzibher, «Ideology and Power in TPLF Ethiopia,» African Affairs, vol. 118, issue 472, July 
2019 sur https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adz005
  　The Tigray Liberation front has been part of the governing coalition since the takeover in 1991.
17　 https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-05/25/content_29490343.htm The PRC opposed the maintenance of 
this status after the election of president Tsai Ing-Wen. Conversely, China had accepted this status to support the 
Kuomintang, which was more favorable to Beijing’s views, while it was in power. 
18　 “加强南南合作提高全球健康水平”(Strengthening South-South cooperation, raising the level of global health) on 
http://www.chinafrica.cn/chinese/focus/201703/t20170315_800091452.html
19　 «Building from Strength, Extending the Strategic Partnership with China,» 18-07-2018 sur https://www.who.int/
china/news/detail/18-07-2018-building-from-strength-expanding-the-strategic-partnership-between-who-and-
china
to the “one China” principle, following China’s 
desire to no longer grant Taiwan obser ver 
status, under the name “Chinese Taipei,” in 
force from 2009 to 2016.17 Whatever its merits 
as a biologist, it is its status as “representative 
of the global South” and more particularly of a 
continent and a country where China’s influence 
is considerable, which weighed in Beijing’s 
choice to support its candidacy, as a way of 
preserving its own influence with the WHO. 
In a speech at the Peking University Public 
Policy International Forum on March 14, 2017, 
a few months before his election, Tedros, still 
minister of foreign affairs, said that “China-Africa 
cooperation on health is a model of South-South 
cooperation.18 In 2018, on the occasion of a new 
visit to China, Tedros also declared, according 
to the official wesite of the WHO, that China, 
whose “health system is a model,” could “improve 
the health of 60 million people in the more than 
sixty countries involved in the BRI”. It called 
for strengthening the “strategic par tnership 
between China and the WHO” and enhancing 
cooperation with China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) project in the field of health.19 Moreover, a 
Chinese diplomat, Mr. Fu Cong is an advisor to 
the Director general.
What are the consequences for WHO’s 
dealing with the coronavirus crisis?
Established in 1948, WHO plays the leading 
role in the prevention of epidemics and the 





authoritative in public perception of health 
threats and government decision-making. 
According to the WHO International Health 
Regulations revised in 2005 after the SARS crisis 
to answer China’s lack of cooperation, which 
are legally binding for all 196 countries in the 
world, the principles of transparency, diligence 
in reporting the emergence of an epidemic, 
and respect for human rights and individual 
freedoms must govern the management of a 
health crisis. The degree of urgency defined 
by WHO weighs on the measures adopted by 
States. 
In this respect, China’s management of 
the covid19 crisis, relayed by the WHO, is 
problematic.20 While uncer tainty remains 
about the first cases, on 30 December, a group 
of doctors mentioned in a private WeChat 
discussion the worrying increase in SARS-type 
pneumonia in Wuhan.21 The seven doctors, 
including Dr. Li Wenliang, were summoned on 
3 January by the Wuhan security bureau and 
ordered to publish a retraction for spreading 
“false rumors.”22
On 31 December, China’s Public Health 
Committee repor ted to WHO “41 cases of 
pneumonia of unknown origin.”23 On the same 
day, Taiwan also repor ted suspect cases in 
Wuhan, mentioning that they were “isolated” 
from other patients. However, Taiwan’s – not 
20　 Peter Husson, «China Helped Put this Man in charge of the WHO, is it Paying Off?», The National Interest, 23-03-
2020.
21　 新冠肺炎 “ 吹哨人 ” 李文亮：真相最重要 (For the “whistleblower” Li Wenliang it was the truth that was most 
important), 07-02-2020 on http://china.caixin.com/2020-02-07/101509761.html
22　 Dr. Li Wenliang died on February 7 from Covid 19. 
23　 “Pneumonia of Unknown Cause in China,” 05-01-2020 on https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-
pneumonia-of-unkown-cause-china/en/.
24　 In 2003, following the SARS crisis, strict regulations had already been put in place. With no results. According to 
some sources, wet market selling live animals already reopened in less visible districts and cities. See: https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-08/wuhan-is-returning-to-life-so-are-its-disputed-wet-markets
25　 “Mission Summary, WHO Field Visit to Wuhan,” 22-01-2020 at https://www.who.int/china/news/detail/22-01-
2020-field-visit-wuhan-china-jan-2020.
26　 Gao Yu et al., «How Early Signs of Coronavirus were Spotted, Spread and Throttled in China,» 28-02-2020 sur 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/how-early-signs-of-the-coronavirus-were-spotted-spread-and-
throttled-in-china
and WHO member – warning was not taken into 
account. On January 1, the Wuhan wet market 
closed and was disinfected, the live animals 
destroyed. These actions made it impossible 
to trace the disease back to the coronavirus 
intermediate animal carrier. A “temporar y” 
national ban on trade in live animals and wildlife 
was then put in place before becoming, in 
theor y, permanent.24 On 14 Januar y, Wuhan 
health commission declared that there was 
no evidence of human-to-human transmission 
before the city organized a huge New Year’s 
banquet.
Following a short inspection visit to Wuhan 
on 20-21 January 2020, a WHO experts team 
issued a repor t stating that “sources suggest 
that human-to-human transmission is occurring 
in Wuhan. However, further analysis is needed 
to understand the extent of this transmission.25 
The delegation also noted “China’s rapid 
identification of the virus, its genetic sequencing 
and the provision of strains to make it possible 
to manufacture tests.” At the same time, on 
3 Januar y, the National Health Commission 
reportedly ordered laboratories that had begun 
work on virus sequencing to stop their work 
and destroy the samples. The genome sequence 
was not released, by a Shanghai laboratory, until 
January 11 and then shared with the WHO.26







s t a t e m e n t s  b o t h  i n  Wu h a n  a n d  a t  t h e 
central level did continue to minimize the 
contagiousness of the new coronavirus. At the 
same time, the WHO visiting team indicated that 
“the protocols shared by Chinese experts would be 
used to implement international recommendations 
for infection control, clinical management, and 
case definition.27 “The lack of reliable statistics on 
the number of infections and especially deaths 
at that time could only distort the conclusions 
reached by the Delegation that was never 
allowed to conduct an independent investigation.
Despite these delays, WHO has issued 
positive statements on the treatment of the 
epidemic by the Chinese authorities, as well 
as instructions not to “stigmatize” China. In 
an address to the standing committee of the 
political bureau of the CCP on Februar y 3, 
2020, Xi Jinping declared: “I met with WHO 
Director-General Tedros, he told me that the 
speed and extent of the actions taken by China are 
exceptional, it is China’s institutional advantage, 
an experience that should be studied by other 
countries28 
Until the declaration of a pandemic by 
WHO on 11 March and beyond, the Director-
General’s statements and recommendations 
generally favored Chinese positions. At the end 
of the official meeting between Xi Jinping and 
the Director-General on 28 January 2020, after 
the city of Wuhan and the province were placed 
under quarantine on 23 January, the Director-
General declared that China was setting a “new 
standard” in health crisis management. Similarly, 
at the Munich Security Conference, Tedros 
again declared that “China has offered the world 
time.”
27　 “Mission Summary, WHO Field Visit to Wuhan,” op.cit.
28　 Xi Jinping, “为打赢疫情防控阻击战提供强大科技支撑 ” (Providing important technological and scientific support 
to win the battle for the prevention and control of the epidemic,” 02-03-2020, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/
qs/2020-03/15/c_1125710612.htm
29　 «World Health Authorities Now Have a Name for the Coronavirus Illness,» 11-02-2020 sur https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/02/11/world/asia/coronavirus-china.html#link-4dc10301
30　 These tweets were sent by trolls originating from mainland China as part of an info war campaign. 
The WHO also decided not to declare 
a pandemic at the end of Januar y, limiting 
the threat level to the PHEIC (Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern) level, 
despite experts’ concerns. The pandemic status 
will not be declared until March 11, more than 
three months after the first alerts in China. On 
several occasions, the WHO also denounced 
the closure of borders with China. The choice 
of the name of COVID 19 on 11 March had also 
been made, taking into account China’s fear of 
being stigmatized. According to Mr. Tedros’ 
statements, “We had to find a name that did not 
refer to a geographical location, an animal or a 
particular population group29 At the same time, 
Dr. Tedros also followed the PRC’s position on 
Taiwan, including a smear campaign claiming 
he received personal insults from the Taiwanese 
tweeter community.30
Conclusion
The management of the COVID 19 pandemic 
poses a collective challenge to the entire world. 
Beyond health issues, it also raises the question 
of how multilateralism works in the absence 
of a community of values between the main 
stakeholders. While China has today become the 
world’s second-largest economic power, and the 
leading trading power, at the heart of globalized 
supply chains, the nature of its political system 
poses specific threats to the world that are not 
taken into account. 
Since the 1970s, China has developed close 
ties with the African continent playing on both 
characteristics as part of the “global South” 
developing countries as well as a financial 





apparently “no string attached.” Filling a vacuum 
left by the former colonial powers and the Soviet 
Union after the end of the Cold War, the PRC 
strengthened its influence in a region where 
one of its main assets is its diplomatic weight 
at the UN. In that context, Ethiopia occupies a 
special place. The close and long-standing ties 
between the current ruling party and the PRC, 
and Ethiopia’s role in the African Union, make it 
a privileged strategic partner for Beijing. 
The appointment of  Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus as Director-General of WHO in 
2017 was a way for the PRC to preser ve its 
disproportionate influence in this international 
institution. Mr. Tedros’ statements and positions 
show that Beijing’s strategy of influence did 
indeed serve its interests. However, the failure 
of the WHO to play its role and the considerable 
humanitarian and economic consequences for 
the whole world could lead to an awareness 
of the need to reconsider the foundations 
and how multilateral institutions operate, but 
also the commitment of democratic powers to 
countries most vulnerable to China’s strategies 
of influence.
